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I. Introduction
In Batson v. Kentucky,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a criminal prosecutor may not violate the equal
protection clause by exercising peremptory challenges in a
particular case when the defendant and stricken jurors are
of the same racial group.' There is already a burgeoning
amount of literature on Batson and its broader implica-
tions. Recent articles have examined Batson's lower court
implementation,4 its implications for the peremptory chal-
lenge in general, 5 its significance for groups other than
blacks,' and its possible application to civil trials.7
A growing number of litigants have sought to persuade
courts to extend the logic of Batson to cases in which the
criminal defendant, rather than the prosecutor, has exer-
t Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
2. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
3. See, e.g., Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Pa-
tient, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 97 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1988).
4. See, e.g., Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementa-
tion of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremp-
tory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989);
Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Jury In a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Mayfield, Batson and Groups Other Than Blacks: A Strict Scru-
tiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Patton, The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil
Litigation: Practice, Procedure and Review, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 921 (1988);
Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Fur-
ther Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891
(1988).
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cised his peremptory challenges in an allegedly discrimina-
tory manner. 8 Still others have attempted to extend the rea-
soning in Batson to the use of peremptory challenges in civil
cases, 9 where the party exercising the challenges is a pri-
vate, non-governmentally affiliated litigant."0 The discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges may generally be ob-
jected to as violative of a state statute' or state
constitution.12 The issue, however, is often litigated under a
federal constitutional provision, 3 such as the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause,' 4 or the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
clause, 5 which requires a showing of state action.'6
It is settled law that an individual acting merely as a pri-
8. See, e.g., People v. Pagel, 186 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987); People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d
1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d
1056, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Cross,
845 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1988); Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D.
Ii. 1988); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986); Espo-
sito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986); City of Miami v. Cornett,
463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 469 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1985).
10. See, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 860 F.2d
1308 (1989); Holley v. J&S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr.
74 (1983).
11. See, e.g., People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988) (criminal case involving prosecutor's striking of women potential
jurors; discusses various state statutes).
12. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1978) (pre-Batson criminal case relying independently on California Consti-
tution); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988) (criminal case relying on Flor-
ida Constitution).
13. See, e.g., Holley v. J&S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 74 (1983) (referring to Seventh Amendment and California Constitution);
Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (criminal case relying on
the Sixth Amendment as well as Colorado Constitution).
14. See, e.g., Fludd, 863 F.2d at 824 & n.3; Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310 &
n.9 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); United States v. Townsley,
856 F.2d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (criminal case referring to the
Sixth Amendment and "the Equal Protection Clause").
15. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987); People v. Evans,
125 I!. 2d 50, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (1988); People v. McDonald, 125 I11. 2d 182, 530
N.E.2d 1351 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828; Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1311.
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vate party cannot violate the equal protection clause, re-
gardless of how patently invidious or harmful the party's
conduct may be. 7 When an individual is acting as a private
party, even a showing of intentional racial discrimination
will not suffice to invoke constitutional protection. 8 In order
for various federal constitutional protections to be operative
through the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must show
state or governmental action.19
The problem in applying the Batson reasoning is the cur-
rent lack of authoritative Supreme Court guidance on state
action questions arising in the context of peremptory chal-
lenges. State action will be uncontroversially present when a
government prosecutor challenges, and the presiding judge
excuses, prospective jurors in a criminal case.2" State action
should also normally be found when an attorney represent-
ing a governmental entity in a civil matter similarly exer-
cises peremptory juror challenges.2" The difficult state ac-
tion cases arise when a criminal defendant or private civil
litigant exercises the peremptory challenges. The Supreme
17. See Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1311.
18. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L. Ed.
2d 627 (1972) (alleged refusal of state-licensed lodge facility to serve alcohol to
blacks).
19. See the authorities cited supra note 16. At the Supreme Court level, see
generally National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. ., 109 S.
Ct. 454, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1988); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S. Ct. 2250,
101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988); Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,
108 S. Ct. 1340, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 552, 107 S. Ct. 2971, 97 L. Ed. 2d 427
(1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534
(1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d
482 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 73 L. Ed. 2d
418 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed.
2d 185 (1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 477 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961). The closest the Supreme Court has come to address-
ing the issue of state action in the context of a private litigant's peremptory strike
of a juror is Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d
509 (1981).
20. See Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1313.
21. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 n.6 (D. Conn.
1986).
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Court has not yet provided specific guidance for the use of
peremptory challenges by private civil litigants and criminal
defendants.
In the absence of specific Supreme Court guidance, liti-
gants naturally turn to Supreme Court decisions that adju-
dicate the state action issue in other contexts. Unfortu-
nately, those cases offer little decisive direction because the
various decisions provide rhetorical and precedential ammu-
nition for both sides of the issue. This lack of clarity reflects
the undeniably confused condition of contemporary state ac-
tion case law in general. 22
This Article briefly develops some of the relevant themes
enunciated in Batson, and then moves to a critical discus-
sion of the growing case law concerning the extension of
Batson into areas raising difficult state action issues. In ad-
dition, this Article explores the arguments and case law that
analyze the presence or absence of state action in a typical
case and then proposes a solution to the state action prob-
lem. The Article concludes by expressing some reservations
concerning the unavoidable theoretical complexity, specula-
tiveness, and subjectivity, involved in defining and applying
the Batson test in its present form.
II. Batson and the Commitment to Equal Protection
in the Courtroom Itself
In Batson, the Court overruled, in part, its decision in
22. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1690 (2d
ed. 1988); Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 N.W.U.L. REV. 503, 504
(1985); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984); Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed
Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 148 (1976); Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Ap-
proach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745 (1981); Schneider, The 1982 State Action Tril-
ogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1150 (1985); Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equal-
ity, 33 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988). These authors reflect the strong academic
consensus.
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Swain v. Alabama.23 In Swain, the Court recognized in
principle that a criminal prosecutor's exercise of racially-
based peremptory jury challenges might violate the equal
protection clause. 4 The Swain Court noted that peremptory
challenges themselves are not exercisable as a matter of
constitutional right,25 but viewed the peremptory challenge
as a well-established means of arriving at a competent and
impartial jury. "6
More importantly, the Court in Swain determined that al-
lowing the defendant to object to the prosecutor's alleged
racially-based abuse of peremptory challenges in a particu-
lar case would unjustifiably impair the character of the pe-
remptory challenge itself.27 Therefore, the Swain Court left
the criminal defendant without a remedy unless the defend-
ant could somehow show that the prosecutor "in case after
case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and
whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible
for the removal of Negroes who have ... survived chal-
lenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve
on petit juries."' 28 Not surprisingly, Swain was widely inter-
preted as largely immunizing the prosecutor's peremptory
challenge from serious scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. 29 To require a showing of pervasive or historical ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, however, would be in-
consistent with the Constitution's implicit promise "of equal
protection to all."3
In contrast to Swain, the Court in Batson was much more
receptive to the idea of establishing illicit racial discrimina-
23. 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965).
24. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
25. Id. at 219.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 221-22.
28. Id. at 223.
29. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 69, 84 (1986).
30. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
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tion in jury selection in a single act or a single case."1 The
Court recognized the inherent potential for abuse in al-
lowing the unrestricted use of the peremptory challenge32
and, therefore, established a general procedure for a crimi-
nal defendant to follow. The criminal defendant challenging
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on racial
grounds "first must show that he is a member of a cogniza-
ble racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race."'3 3 The defendant is then allowed to
refer to any relevant facts or circumstances in order to raise
an inference of the prosecutor's purposeful discrimination. 4
If the defendant is able to successfully raise such an infer-
ence, thereby establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."3 "
The Batson Court therefore relied on a distinction be-
tween race-neutral and discriminatory explanations for pe-
remptory challenges of blacks. As the concluding section of
this Article demonstrates, this distinction appears to raise
profoundly difficult questions not easily resolved in the
courtroom context. The Court did not profess to offer a
principled analysis of the distinction between race-neutral
and discriminatory reasons, but it did specify that "the pros-
ecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying ex-
ercise of a challenge for cause."' 36 On the other hand, the
31. Id. at 93.
32. Id.
33. Id. This language immediately raises issues left unresolved in Batson, such
as the scope of "cognizable" racial, or non-racial, groups; the possibility of a de-
fendant who is a member of one cognizable group objecting to peremptory chal-
lenges of members of other groups; the application of Batson in multi-party cases;
and whether a defendant may object to the peremptory strike of a single individual
juror. On the latter point, see id. at 99 n.22.
34. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42, 248, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2048-
49, 2052, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608-09, 612 (1976).
35. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
36. Id.
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prosecutor's explanation on rebuttal must rise above a mere
denial of discriminatory motive.3 ' The prosecutor's mere as-
sertion of good faith,"8 or assumption that the challenged
juror would tend to be partial to the accused because of
their shared membership in a particular racial group, would
not justify a prosecutor's peremptory strike of that juror."9
The Batson Court declined to specify definite procedures
a defendant or court should use when contesting peremptory
challenges.4" The Court also failed to decide whether the
prosecutor could object to the criminal defendant's exercise
of peremptory challenges on the grounds that they were ra-
cially motivated. 41 The only guidance the Batson Court of-
fered was how an appellate court should treat the trial
court's reaction to racially challenged peremptory strikes.
The Court stated that although an appellate court would
give "great deference" to the trial judge's findings on mat-
ters of credibility,4 z it would be prejudicial error if the trial
court denied the defendant a racially neutral explanation for
the prosecutor's use of the challenged strikes. 3
III. The Developing State Action Case Law Under
Batson
The Batson case involved peremptory strikes exercised by
a state criminal prosecutor and posed no serious state action
issue because the state prosecutor was undeniably an officer
of the state.44 As a result, the Court declined to address the
applicability of its principles to peremptory challenges by
37. Id. at 98.
38. Id.
39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
40. Id. at 99.
41. Id. at 89 n.12.
42. See id. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575-76
(1985)).
43. See id. at 100.
44. Id. at 89.
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criminal defendants or by private parties in civil cases.45 A
number of courts, however, have had occasion to consider
state action issues in one form or another under the Batson
decision.46
The Eleventh Circuit, in Fludd v. Dykes,47 addressed one
variation in which the state action issue may arise. Fludd
involved a civil rights suit brought by a black plaintiff
against a white police officer and the officer's white supervi-
sor. The defendants peremptorily struck two potential black
jurors on the venire and left an all-white jury.48 The plain-
tiff's counsel urged that, under Batson, the defendants must
give a race-neutral explanation for those challenges. The
trial court overruled the plaintiff's objection on the grounds
that Batson was inapplicable to civil cases. 49 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the trial court's conclusion
and remanded for a hearing along the lines discussed in
Batson.50
The Eleventh Circuit duly recognized the presence of a
state action issue. In fact, the court adopted a rather strin-
gent formulation of the general inquiry into the presence or
absence of state action. The court specified that "[t]o estab-
lish a violation of equal protection, a litigant must demon-
strate that the state, and not a private individual, was the
source of the purposeful discrimination. ' 51 The Supreme
Court has itself occasionally presented similar understand-
ings of what state action requires.5 2 The Court, however,
45. See supra note 41 & accompanying text.
46. Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1989) (The
Alabama Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822
(1 th Cir. 1989), and held that Batson applies to state civil cases between private
litigants.).
47. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
48. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 823.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 823-24.
51. Id. at 828.
52. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2756, 73
L. Ed. 2d 534, 546 (1982) (state.action when state has coerced private party de-
fendant in civil rights action, or has so significantly encouraged that party that
[Vol. 13:573
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has also observed that "[i]n the typical case raising a state
action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step that
caused the harm. . ., and the question is whether the State
was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as
state action."53
This latter formulation allows a finding of state action
even if the private actor was the "source" of the discrimina-
tion. The most straightforward analysis would suggest that
in peremptory challenge cases, the "source" of the alleged
discrimination is the party exercising the discriminatory pe-
remptory challenges. Under this analysis, however, the state
may become intimately involved through the actions of the
trial judge, when the trial judge later ratifies, enforces, per-
mits, or merely acquiesces or acknowledges such challenges.
A. Finding State Action
In the search for state action, the court in Fludd surpris-
ingly brushed past the role of the party exercising the pe-
remptory challenges and, instead, focused on the trial
court's overruling of the plaintiff's motion. The Fludd
court's analysis was surprising for three reasons. First, the
challenging party would seem to be the obvious source or
origin of the alleged discrimination, even if the "final" deci-
sion is left to the trial judge.54 Second, the challenging party
could be tied rather closely to the state itself because the
defendants were a police officer and his supervisor who had
allegedly violated the fourteenth amendment under color of
state law.55 The United States Supreme Court has often as-
serted that the requirements for acting under color of state
"the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2771, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418, 427 (1982).
53. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 109
S. Ct. 454, 462, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469, 484-85 (1988).
54. See Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828.
55. Id. at 823-24.
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law are identical to those for showing state action.56 It
would not have been unusual for the Fludd court to find
that, because the defendants were possibly acting under
color of state law at the time of the underlying incident,
they were also acting under color of state law in exercising
their peremptory challenges.
Finally, by focusing on the trial judge's overruling of the
plaintiff's objections to the defendant's peremptory chal-
lenges, the Eleventh Circuit created certain logical
problems. Although the trial judge's authoritative ruling on
an objection is state action, the logic of the Fludd Court's
approach to finding state action under the Batson decision
unravels. The court's analysis of the judge's role is that:
In overruling the objection [to the use of peremptory
challenges on racial grounds], which informed the court
that the peremptory challenges may be excluding blacks
from the venire on account of their race, the judge be-
comes guilty of the sort of discriminatory conduct that
the equal protection clause proscribes. Because the trial
judge constitutes the discriminatory state actor under
the equal protection clause, we conclude that there is no
constitutional bar to the application of Batson to a civil
suit.57
The Fludd Court's reasoning may seem sound insofar as
it suggests that the judges themselves engage in discrimina-
tory conduct or issue discriminatory rulings. The Fludd de-
cision's overall unsoundness, however, becomes evident when
one examines the precise grounds on which the judge is to
rule when the plaintiff objects to the defendants' misuse of
the peremptory challenges. The objection at this early point
56. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 40, 49 (1988); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-32, 935 &
n.18, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2749-51 & n.18, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 489-92, 494 & n.18
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769-70, 73
L. Ed. 2d 418, 425-26 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7, 86 S.
Ct. 1152, 1156-57 n.7, 16 L. Ed. 2d 267, 272 n.7 (1966).
57. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828.
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in the trial cannot be based on the trial judge's possible fu-
ture conduct in overruling the objection itself and would be
self-evidently premature. Instead, under Batson the objec-
tion must be that the defendants' conduct in exercising their
peremptory challenges as they did violates the equal protec-
tion clause. When the plaintiff objects to the defendant's use
of peremptory challenges, alleging that they were racially
motivated, he is essentially asking the trial court whether it
agrees with this contention. Under appropriate circum-
stances, the trial court may well wish to agree with the
plaintiff's objection by finding that the defendants' conduct
amounts to a prima facie case of violation of the plaintiff's
right to equal protection. To be sustained on appeal, how-
ever, the trial court must find sufficient state action associ-
ated with the objectionable conduct. 8
The trial judge's search for state action is confined to oc-
currences that have already taken place. The court's focus
should normally be on the conduct of the party making the
peremptory challenge, in the light of all the relevant circum-
stances. The relevant actions and circumstance include those
of the courtroom, the trial process, the surrounding judicial
system, and the trial judge's own role and decisions up to
the point of the objection, including his excusing of those
stricken jurors. If the facts do not supply sufficient state ac-
tion, the trial court cannot supply state action by consider-
ing the possible incorrect ruling it would make in denying
the Batson objection. If at the time of the objection there is
insufficient state action, from whatever source, any objection
to a peremptory challenge based on an alleged denial of
equal protection must be overruled. The Eleventh Circuit's
focus on the trial court's overruling of the defendant's objec-
tion and proceeding to trial as an element of the necessary
58. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961).
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state action, therefore, seems mistaken. 9
The Fifth Circuit in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,"0 took a more traditional approach to the question of
state action. In Edmonson, the plaintiff was a black con-
struction worker who sued Leesville Concrete Company for
negligence. At trial, the defendant peremptorily challenged
two black and one white prospective jurors, leaving a jury of
eleven whites and one black.6" The plaintiff requested that
the court require the defendant to present a racially neutral
explanation for its use of its peremptory challenges. The
trial court denied the plaintiff's motion on the grounds that
the Batson requirements were not applicable to civil trials.62
The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court and found the req-
uisite state action despite the private status of the party ex-
ercising the peremptory challenges.6 " The Edmonson court
cited a number of Supreme Court cases where the Court
found state action in a variety of contexts." The court took
what amounts to two separate routes in finding state action.
For convenience, these will be referred to as the Lugar65
route and the Burton66 route.
59. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828. Whether the state action in Fludd should be shown
under the Fifth Amendment, because of the role of the federal judge, or under the
Fourteenth Amendment, because of the role of the arguably state-affiliated de-
fendants, or under both, because of their joint roles, is fortunately a question of no
great practical consequence.
60. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 860 F.2d 1308 (1989). Inter-
estingly, Senior Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit joined both
the majority opinion in Edmonson and the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in
Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (1lth Cir. 1984).
61. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1314.
64. E.g., Tulsa Prof. Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340,
99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct.
2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of
City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 77 S. Ct. 806, 1 L. Ed. 2d 792, reh'g denied, 353 U.S.
989 (1957); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
65. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d
482 (1982).
66. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed.
2d 45 (1961).
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B. The Lugar Route
Under the Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 7 decision, the
crucial question is whether the private actor whose conduct
is being objected to may appropriately be called a state ac-
tor."8 The private party defendants in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.69 were not state actors, nor acting in the name
of the state, when exercising their peremptory challenges.
Lugar, however, suggests that sometimes the joint participa-
tion of a private party and a state official may establish the
private party as a state actor. 0
The Lugar method of finding state action is problematic.
If the ultimate issue is whether a private litigant, or even an
attorney, is a state actor, ample Supreme Court authority in
other contexts suggests a negative answer.7 Probably the
single largest obstacle to finding state action in peremptory
challenge cases via the Lugar method is the Supreme
Court's analysis in Polk County v. Dodson. 2 In Dodson, the
Court held that a public defender employed full-time by
67. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982).
68. See 860 F.2d at 1311 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
939 (1982)).
69. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
70. See id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941).
71. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 107 S. Ct. 2971, 97 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1987) (United States
Olympic Committee not a governmental actor for state action purposes); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982); Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978) (warehouse-
man's sale of goods entrusted to him, pursuant to state statutory authorization,
does not amount to state action even where such sales traditionally undertaken by
sheriff); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 477 (1974) (heavily regulated private utility monopoly not engaged in state
action in discontinuing electric service pursuant to state's general procedural au-
thorization). See also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.
.- 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 n.5, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469, 478 n.5 (1988) (citing
recent cases holding that the National Collegiate Athletic Association is not a
state actor for state action purposes).
72. 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1982) (Judge Gee referred
to Dodson in his dissenting opinion in Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316.).
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Polk County did not act under color of state law73 in filing a
motion to withdraw from representing Dodson in his crimi-
nal appeal. The public defender's motion to withdraw was
accompanied by a memorandum and an affidavit discussing
the frivolous nature of Dodson's appeal.14 The Iowa Su-
preme Court granted the defense attorney's motion and dis-
missed Dodson's appeal.7"
While it is true that a state-employed public defender in
some sense opposes the interests of "the state," the court in
Dodson disposed of the argument that a lawyer representing
her client before a court, while acting as an "officer of the
court," must be considered a state actor.76 Rather, the
Court noted that the adversary system assumes that "a de-
fense lawyer best serves the public not by acting on behalf
of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing
'the undivided interests of his client.'-"' Presumably, a
court could apply the Dodson reasoning to attorneys in civil
actions as well as public defenders in criminal cases. It
would seem to follow that, under the Lugar test for state
action, a private counsel exercising peremptory jury chal-
lenges would be considered a "state actor" in view of his
"joint participation"7 8 with the trial judge in making and
giving effect to the peremptory challenges.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 7 0 however, Judge
Gee noted in his dissent that the action of the trial judge in
excusing the potential jurors peremptorily challenged by
counsel appears to be ministerial in character."0 The trial
judge's involvement in excusing jurors in a civil case is no
73. The tests for state action and for acting under color of state law have been
held to be equivalent. See supra note 56 & accompanying text.
74. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 314-17.
75. Id. at 314-15 & n.2.
76. Id. at 318.
77. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204, 100 S. Ct.
402, 409, 62 L. Ed. 2d 355, 363-64 (1979)).
78. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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less ministerial than that of the Iowa Supreme Court in
Dodson. The Dodson court made a judgment on the merits
by deciding whether the withdrawing counsel's contention
that her client's arguments on appeal were frivolous. 8 Even
if a trial court in some sense approves of or acquiesces in
counsel's peremptory challenges, mere approval or acquies-
cence by the government need not amount to state action. 2
The Lugar method of finding state action is, therefore, inva-
lid because it hinges on whether the private party, whose
action is being challenged, can be called a "state actor."
C. The Burton Route
The Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority"3 used an alternative method of finding state ac-
tion. In Burton, a privately owned and operated restaurant
located on government owned property refused service to a
patron because he was black. The Burton Court found state
action because the restaurant was located in a state-owned
parking garage and paid rent to the state under its lease.84
The Court reasoned that, under the circumstances, the
state had abdicated its responsibilities by failing to discour-
age or censure the evident racial discrimination of its pri-
vate lessee.85 The Court in Burton found a degree of mutual
benefit86 in the relationship between the restaurant and the
state that may not be matched in a peremptory challenge
case. How the trial court profits from a private litigant's dis-
81. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 314-15 & n.2.
82. The Court has stated that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initia-
tives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for
those initiatives under the terms of the fourteenth amendment." Blum, 457 U.S. at
1004-05. See also Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 164-65 (state's acquiescence does
not create state action); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (private action in accordance
with formal state permission or authorization as not rising to the level of state
action).
83. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961).
84. Burton, 365 U.S. at 712.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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criminatory abuse of peremptory challenges is hardly clear.
The majority in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 7
recognized the Burton decision and observed:
The government is intimately involved in the process by
which a litigant challenges a prospective juror: the gov-
ernment summons the venire to appear in court at a
particular time and place; the right to peremptory chal-
lenges is granted by a federal statute; the challenges are
invoked in the course of a judicial proceeding, and on a
facility operated by the government . . .; they are not
self-executing but are effected by the action of the
judge; and the judge as government official acts in a
court required by the Constitution to be open to the
public which may thereby observe the court's toleration
of the practice. The litigant exercises the peremptory
challenge, but it is the judge, acting in a judicial capac-
ity, who excuses the prospective juror.8"
The Edmonson court does not appear to suggest that a gov-
ernment official's toleration of an otherwise private act gen-
erates state action. Rather, the court recognized that, under
Burton, the overall circumstances under which the peremp-
tory challenges are exercised may be such as to give rise to
private as well as governmentally shared responsibility.
Utilizing the Burton method, the presence or absence of
state action is a function of whether it would be appropriate
to find the government at least partially responsible for the
actions of a private party. Actually, a number of cases have
discussed state action issues with reference to the idea of
state responsibility 89 State responsibility, and state action,
in Burton may be said to flow from the circumstances. In
87. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1312.
89. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725, see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S.
at 522; Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936, 937; Kohn, 457 U.S. at
840; Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 164; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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Burton, the "private" racial discrimination took place in a
combination restaurant and public parking facility bearing"official signs indicating the public character of the build-
ing, and [which] flew from mastheads on the roof both the
state and national flags." 0 The person subjected to racial
discrimination in Burton might well have attributed this in-
sult, at least in part, to the public authority.
Similarly, the plaintiff or the excused jurors in Edmonson
might well, under the circumstances,9' have ascribed at least
partial responsibility for their discriminatory treatment to
the state, because of the trial judge or the judicial process
itself. Under such reasoning, the state's involvement with
the discriminatory peremptory challenges might be deemed"so pervasive and substantial that it must be considered
state action." 92
It would be impractical in this Article to develop a theory
of what kind or degree of responsibility would amount to
state action, or what considerations or factors are relevant
to ascribing responsibility.9" One factor that is easy to over-
look, however, is that of the gravity or seriousness of the
harm allegedly inflicted. As a matter of common moral
sense, we are more likely to impute responsibility to a by-
stander for failing to save a person from drowning than for
failing to remove a painful hangnail, even if the cost of "res-
cue" is comparable in both cases. Undeniably, the harm of
racial discrimination is so much more "serious" that one
should be more willing to find government responsibility in
racially-based peremptory challenge cases than in other
non-racial contexts.94
90. Burton, 365 U.S. at 720.
91. See supra text accompanying note 88.
92. Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 108 S. Ct.
1340, 1346, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565, 577 (1988).
93. For an analysis along these lines, see Wright, State Action and State Re-
sponsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. (1990).
94. See, e.g., Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1982); Schneider, State Action-Making Sense
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This is not to suggest that no significant difference exists
between the degree of government involvement in criminal
prosecutions and that in civil actions between merely private
litigants,95 or whether the Batson requirements should be
applied to civil actions.96 Until the Supreme Court authori-
tatively addresses the issue, courts will predictably continue
to differ on the applicability of Batson to civil actions be-
tween private parties.9 7
Out of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 742 (1985). But
see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court has not
adopted the notion, accepted elsewhere, that different standards should apply to
state-action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented.").
95. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
96. Even as of the time of the panel decision in Edmonson, the court was able
to refer to a division of authority on the applicability of Batson to civil cases. See
Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1314. It should be noted, however, that the Edmonson
majority's reference to the Eighth Circuit's " 'strong doubts' that Batson is limited
to criminal cases," id., is misleading, in that the Eighth Circuit's "strong doubts"
in dicta appear to run the other direction. See Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164-
65 (8th Cir. 1988); Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[w]e
have previously expressed 'strong doubts' whether Batson applies to civil cases")
(citing Wilson, 854 F.2d at 163).
97. The number of cases addressing the state action issue in the general Batson
context of course continues to increase. See, e.g., Maloney v. Washington, 690 F.
Supp. 687 (N.D. I11. 1988) (applying Batson in a civil case to both the white police
officer plaintiffs, thereby assuming whites to be a cognizable racial group, and the
defendants, the City of Chicago and the estate of the late Mayor Harold Washing-
ton, with only a perfunctory discussion of the state action problems). The Seventh
Circuit noted the issue in a related case, Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155
(7th Cir. 1988), but declined to express an opinion on the state action issue. See
also Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 & n.6 (D. Conn. 1986)
(state action easily found in that the civil defendant, the City of Bridgeport, exer-
cised its peremptory challenges through the official action of the assistant city at-
torney); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986) (Meskill, J.,
sitting by designation) (finding Batson inapplicable in light of the objecting party's
status as a voluntary plaintiff in a civil action, especially where the plaintiff had
not shown himself to be a member of a cognizable racial group) (not reaching the
state action issue); Perry v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 527 So. 2d 696, 698 n.1
(Ala. 1988) (declining to reach the issue of Batson's applicability to a civil set-
ting); Holley v. J&S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1983) (applying California state constitutional restrictions to use of peremptory
challenges in civil case); City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), appeal dismissed, 469 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1985) (restricting the use of pe-
remptory challenges in a civil case under a Florida state constitutional provision;
the peremptory challenges were exercised by attorneys for the City of Miami, thus
minimizing any potential state action issue).
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D. Applying Batson to Criminal Defendant's Use of
Peremptory Challenges
Among the criminal cases raising a significant state ac-
tion issue, one of the most elaborate discussions to date is
contained in People v. Gary M.91 In Gary M., the state ob-
jected to a minority criminal defendant's use of peremptory
challenges against white potential jurors. 99 The court con-
cluded that a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges may be prohibited by the New
York and federal Constitution."°° The court further con-
cluded that white potential jurors may be considered a cog-
nizable group under the equal protection clause."0 '
On the state action question, the court in Gary M. took
into consideration seven factors, recognizing that perhaps
none of these factors individually would be decisive. 0 2 The
Gary M. court considered such factors as: (1) The occur-
rence of the discrimination in the context of a state criminal
prosecution;0 3 (2) The attorney engaging in the discrimina-
tion is a state-licensed and state-regulated officer of the
court;10 4 (3) The challenges were made in open court in a
public courtroom;1 0 5 (4) Peremptory challenges are highly
regulated and are themselves not a matter of constitutional
right;10 (5) The racial character of the discrimination; 07
(6) The necessity for the court itself to exclude the chal-
98. 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
99. Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
100. Id. at 992.
101. Id. at 994 (citing authority). But cf. United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d
1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (white criminal defendants may not object
to government's striking of black potential jurors); United States v. Angiulo, 847
F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 314 (1988).
102. Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
103. Id. at 992-93.
104. Id. at 993.
105. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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lenged juror;1°8 and (7) The role of the state in bringing to
court the juror who is challenged on racial grounds. °9
The Gary M. court was well-aware that the Supreme
Court in Dodson had not attached much weight to the "of-
ficer of the court" factor."' Arguably, the court in Gary M.
underplayed the consideration that the state, in its role as
prosecutor, had itself expressly and openly objected to and
condemned the discriminatory challenges made by the pri-
vate defense counsel."' This factor distinguishes the state
action issue in Gary M. from that involved in most of the
Supreme Court cases finding state action. 1 2
Gary M.'s own methodology makes it difficult to discern
whether this distinction is compelling in light of the other
factors the court cites. If the seven factors separately are
insufficient but, in the aggregate, point to state action, the
result is inherently unpredictable when one or more factors
is missing or somehow counterbalanced. Ultimately, the
soundest determination of the state action issue posed in
Gary M. will be one that focuses on the concept of responsi-
bility." 3 In particular, state action should be based on the
circumstances and appropriateness of assigning at least par-
tial responsibility to the government for the consequences of
the abuse of the peremptory challenge system."" Gary M.
recognized" 5 that any alleged racial discrimination, even
against white" 6 prospective jurors, is sufficiently serious to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 993-94.
110. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d
509 (1982); see also Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 993 n.7.
111. See Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89.
112. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961) (government's failure to explicitly disavow or reject
defendant-lessee's racial discrimination).
113. See supra notes 83-84 & accompanying text.
114. See supra note 94 & accompanying text.
115. See Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
116. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 109 S. Ct.
706, 721, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 882 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("equal protec-
tion cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
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make it difficult for even a constitutionally limited govern-
ment to disclaim responsibility." 7
An additional factor bearing upon attributions of respon-
sibility has to do with the possibility of government control.
On most theories of responsibility, if the government was
genuinely unable to identify and prevent the private act in
question, one would be reluctant to ascribe responsibility for
a private act to that government." 8 In a peremptory chal-
lenge context, a fair-minded and perceptive trial judge will
doubtless be able to identify and prevent the empaneling of
juries reflecting the most blatant and systematic racial dis-
crimination in jury selection. The current application of the
Batson test, however, may require the trial court to resolve
complex and delicate issues of social philosophy. When, for
example, does a prosecutor's apparently racially neutral ex-
planation of a peremptory challenge fail because it involves
a juror characteristic so closely correlated with race as to
amount to a proxy for race itself?""9 Even then, the court
when applied to a person of another color") (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2747-48, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750,
770-71 (1978) (Powell, J.)).
117. The court in People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367
(Sup. Ct. 1988), adopted a finding of state action in connection with peremptory
challenges by a criminal defendant, largely on a theory of the "pervasive involve-
ment" of the court itself in implementing racially-based peremptory challenges by
the defendant. See Muriale, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 371. To the extent that Muriale
suggests that state action may be merely a matter of finding the "participation,
facilitation, and acquiescence" of the state in the discrimination, id., the Muriale
test may sweep too broadly. The presence of these elements clearly does not insure
a finding of state responsibility, or state action. This can be seen in the example of
the police participating in, facilitating, and acquiescing in an act of private racial
or other discrimination by enforcing the removal of an unwanted social guest from
private residential property under a general trespass law. The courts would pre-
sumably decline to find state action in such a context, at least without further
complicating circumstances. But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20, 685 S. Ct.
836, 845, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1161, 1184 (1948) (state action in court's enforcement of
private racially restrictive covenant), cited in Muriale, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
118. This sets aside possible complications such as the government's somehow
benefitting from the private act, or ratifying and approving after the fact a private
act that it was powerless to prevent.
119. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 175. At an extreme, consider an allegedly
race-neutral explanation in which the prosecutor asserts that he also would have
challenged anyone else, black or white, who lived relatively close to the black de-
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must go on to attempt, in a non-speculative way, to detect
events or motives that are practically undetectable in a judi-
cial setting. Consider, for example, the difficult problems of
verification, of rebuttal, and of credibility in a prosecutor's
claim that a black potential juror was challenged because of
insufficient eye contact or a momentary facial expression.'
These latter sorts of problems are unavoidable under Bat-
son, and the trial court will not be able to resolve them in a
non-speculative, well-grounded manner. The recent Califor-
nia case of People v. Johnson'2' serves as an illustration.'22
In Johnson, a black criminal defendant objected to the pros-
ecutor's peremptory challenges to three black, four Jewish,
and two Asian jurors' 23 in the course of a voir dire ex-
tending over a period of two months.'2 4 The prosecutor's ex-
planations for such strikes included such elements as appar-
ent tiredness, tell-tale smiling, general rapport, being"weird,"'' 25 the prosecutor's being "totally unable to re-
late"' 12 to a juror, obesity, poor grooming, "a very defensive
body position,"' 127 lack of eye contact, a racing pulse at par-
ticularly telling moments, 28 and nervousness. 12
fendant's neighborhood. For a real-world example, see Ex parte Branch, 526 So.
2d 609, 614-15 (Ala. 1987) (prosecutor's alleged negative experiences in previous
cases with both black and white employees of a major local black employer). For
an example of the essential contestability of neutrality in the realm of gender, see
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. -, , 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1813 n.5,
104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 315 n.5 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (possible gender ster-
eotyping in male's evaluation of a female as "overbearing and abrasive").
120. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1989) (en banc).
121. 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1989) (en banc). On
the peremptory challenge issues, the court was split 5-2.
122. California cases in this area are typically influenced by the California Con-
stitution as interpreted in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), but the problems discussed in this section are endemic to
cases decided under Batson.
123. Johnson, 767 P.2d at 1054.
124. 767 P.2d at 1056.
125. Id. at 1054.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1055.
128. Id. The prosecutor apparently believed himself able to count a juror's pulse
rate in response to particular questions "from jewelry bobbing or from actually
LITIGATING STATE ACTION
The majority in Johnson relied on the trial judge's ability
to somehow ferret out sham or contrived excuses. 13 In do-
ing so, the California Supreme Court returned to a deferen-
tial standard of review of the trial court's findings 13  and
thus overruled its own recent precedent on the point. 32 The
problem, however, is not primarily one of the extent to
which the findings of the trial court should receive deference
on review, or whether "trivial" reasons for exercising pe-
remptory challenges should suffice, 3 3 or the "subjective"
quality of an attorney's reasons for peremptory strikes. 1 4
The larger problem is that neither the trial nor appellate
court is likely to be able to sort out prosecutorial explana-
tions that are pretextual or self-deceiving. 35 Whether, for
example, a prospective juror momentarily glared at one or
more persons in the course of voir dire is simply not subject
to consistently accurate judicial resolution.
This kind of problem is not easily resolved, short of abol-
ishing the peremptory challenge. One possible solution
would be to abolish or dramatically restrict the opportunity
of the party exercising the peremptory challenges to rebut
seeing veins in the neck." Id. at 1091.
129. These and other grounds are referred to in Johnson, 767 P.2d at 1054-55.
130. See id. at 1054.
131. Id. at 1057.
132. Id. (overruling in part People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 704 P.2d 719,
217 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985)).
133. See id. at 1055.
134. See id. at 1085-86 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Presumably, matters such as
failure to make eye contact, or wearing a beard, are objective matters, in the sense
that they are in principle observable by all interested participants. Whether such
matters actually tend to correlate with conviction or acquittal-proneness, or juror
competence, is presumably also something that is susceptible of research and mea-
surement to at least a substantial degree.
135. For one of a number of lists of unweighted non-exhaustive factors a judge
may wish to consider in attempting to pass judgment on the credibility of the
prosecutor's explanations in rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination, see, for
example, State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988). See also Ex parte
Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622-23 (Ala. 1987) (listing similar considerations as rele-vant to whether the objecting party has made out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion). For a discussion of some of the problems associated with this sort of open-
ended multi-factor judicial test, see Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 469 (1987).
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opposing counsel's prima facie case of discrimination. 3 '
Limiting the challenged party's opportunity to rebut would
be worthwhile for the sake of reducing the opportunity for
the exercise of conscious or unconscious racism' 37 in jury
selection. From the standpoint of the state action issue, such
a reform would reduce the strength of the argument that no
state action should be found because the state should not
bear responsibility for what it cannot with any reliability
identify and control.
136. See the description of this rebuttal phase in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 97-98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88-89 (1986).
137. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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